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ABSTRACT 
Measures from standardized surveys are the main data source for cross-cultural re-
search. Yet, a direct link between survey responses and individual behavior is rarely ob-
served.  We study the link between values and various forms of pro-social behavior. We 
invite the respondents of the sixth wave of the World Values Survey in Germany to par-
ticipate in an online experiment. The experiment consists of a series of incentivized 
games and allows us to study the link between survey measured moral values and be-
havior. The evidence boils down to three findings. While emancipative values motivate 
higher common pool contributions (1) and higher donations to charitable organizations 
(2), secular values inspire more productive and less protective investments (3). We ar-
gue that incentivized behavioral experiments offer a promising complementary tool to 
measure cross-societal differences, with the distinct advantage that the underlying deci-
sion situation is defined by formal rules and payoff functions, which are independent of 
language and cultural context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely understood that cooperative behavior among strangers is the key ingredient 
of thriving societies in which institutions function impartially (Axelrod, 1986; Ostrom, 
1990; Coleman, 1990; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). At the 
same time, countless writings suggest that moral values provide a major source of co-
operative behavior (Kluckhohn, 1951; Eckstein, 1966, 1998; Inkeles, 1969, 1983; 
Rokeach, 1968, 1973; Axelrod, 1986; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Welzel, 2010). But the claim 
that moral values indeed guide cooperative behavior has more often been assumed than 
evidenced. One reason for this missing value-behavior link is the separation of the social 
sciences into two different methodological traditions—a separation that is rarely bridged. 
For one, incentivized behavioral experiments are a growing industry in the obser-
vational social sciences. This is especially true for those fields of research interested in 
the origins of human cooperation. The main advantage of behavioral game theory 
(Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Camerer, 2004) as a method is that it allows for experimental 
control of treatments, which facilitates causal inferences. Moreover, the fact that the 
triggering of behavior is based on a formal game facilitates the comparison of outcomes 
across various cultures, because the underlying decision situation is kept constant 
(Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008; Gächter, Hermann, & Thöni, 2010). By far most of 
these games are still conducted with convenient samples from student populations and 
it is an ongoing debate to what extent the results of such games can be generalized to 
entire national populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  
A different approach to study the sources of people’s social behavior is research 
in moral values. Apart from economic interests and social norms, moral values suppos-
edly guide action towards preferred outcomes (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Hofstede, 
2001[1980], 1997; Schwartz, 2004, 2006, 2007). Usually, data on people’s moral values 
are gathered through public opinion surveys. The largest cross-national project in this 
context is the World Values Survey (WVS). Besides their wide global coverage, the ad-
vantage of these data is their generalizability to entire national populations. Yet, opinion 
surveys lack experimental control and when it comes to study behavior, they only cover 
reported behavior, as opposed to observed behavior. 
It is clear then that the advantages of behavioral experiments and opinion sur-
veys are complementary. Thus, to study the link between moral values and cooperative 
behavior one must combine opinion surveys with behavioral experiments. This is what 
our project did: we used the sixth round of the WVS in Germany to invite the roughly 
2,000 representatively surveyed respondents to participate in an online behavioral ex-
                                               
1  We thank Lorenz Goette as well as the conference participants of the IMEBESS 2015 in Tou-
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periment after they had finished the interview. This allows us for the first time to study 
directly the link between moral values and pro-social behavior. 
Our study focuses on two dimensions of moral values that have shown the 
greatest impact on social outcomes: (1) secular values and (2) emancipative values. We 
look at the link of these values to three types of pro-social behavior: (1) common pool 
contributions, (2) productive versus protective investments and (3) voluntary donations. 
For the first time, we study the link of these values and behaviors directly at the individ-
ual level and within a nationally representative sample.  
We show that survey measures and behavior are linked: (a) emancipative values 
motivate higher common pool contributions, (b) stronger secular values inspire more 
productive and less protective investments, and (c) emancipative values lead to higher 
donations. Even though participants of the online survey display slightly stronger eman-
cipative values compared to the surveyed population, our results are robust when we 
control for selection bias. 
Our methodological contribution is that we develop a novel, internet based be-
havioral experiment. This tool can easily be adapted to other languages and used for 
cross-cultural research. In addition, it is relatively easy to run with large populations be-
cause it does not require a laboratory and subjects can participate from any internet 
connected device. Brislin (1970) pointed out that one of the major challenges of cross-
cultural research is to ensure equivalence when running an empirical study in different 
languages. Differences in measurement cannot unanimously be attributed to differences 
in the variable of interest, because the wording of the instructions and questions might 
give rise to different associations in the various languages. Besides language, context 
can differ considerably between cultures, which might also undermine equivalence (see 
also Hui and Triandis, 1985). While the description of the task in our online study still 
relies to some degree on natural language, we argue that using behavioral experiments 
mitigates the equivalence problem substantially. The reason is that the underlying stra-
tegic situation is a well-defined game, i.e., it consists of a set of formal rules and math-
ematical functions.2  These rules and functions are independent of the cultural context 
and the language of exposition. Furthermore, while the instructions in studies using be-
havioral experiments are typically text based, we make extensive use of graphical ele-
ments when explaining the game to the subjects and minimize the use of text. This fur-
ther reduces the influence of natural language when eliciting data in various cultures. 
On the other hand, conducting behavioral experiments is often more demanding 
in terms of researcher’s as well as responder’s resources. This means that the number of 
concepts that can be measured is typically lower than in surveys of comparable length. 
In the spirit of Hui and Triandis (1985), we see behavioral experiments as a complemen-
tary tool for cross-cultural research, which should be used in combination with other 
methods. Our research presents a cross-validation of a series of behavioral experiments 
with a number of constructs measured by the WVS. 
                                               
2  A strategic game is defined by (i) a set of players, (ii) a set of strategies for each player, and 
(iii) the players’ preferences (see e.g. Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). While (i) and (ii) are 
under full control of the experimenter, the participants preferences are not directly observa-
ble. The pioneering work by Smith (1976) highlighted the importance of inducing prefer-
ences with financial incentives. Smith argues that this can be achieved „[...] by using a re-
ward structure to induce prescribed monetary value on actions“ (p.275).   
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we introduce the design and proce-
dures in more detail. Section 3 presents the results of the behavioral experiments and 
relate them to measures from the WVS. Section 4 concludes. 
 
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
Since 1981, the European Values Study (EVS) and WVS conduct representative public 
opinion surveys in scores of countries around the world. The basis is an English-
language, fully standardized master questionnaire. The questionnaire covers a host of 
topics, from social capital to tolerance to trust to happiness to civic engagement. The 
master questionnaire is translated into national languages with semantic checks through 
back-translation. Questionnaires are administered among randomly selected residents of 
an average sample size of 1,000 people per country. The sampling population consists 
of a given society’s adult residents (not citizens). Fieldwork is usually conducted through 
face-to-face interviews. Average interview length is about fifty minutes. Thus far, the 
EVS/WVS has conducted some 300 national surveys in by now 106 societies that repre-
sent more than 90 percent of the world population. Further details on fieldwork, sam-
pling, questionnaires as well as downloadable datasets can be found at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org. All data are public domain. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the WVS finalized its most recent and sixth round of 
surveys in a total of sixty societies. As part of this project, the sixth German WVS was 
fielded in fall 2013. Roughly 2,000 interviews have been realized. A methods report is 
available at the above cited website of the WVS. To link observed behavior in the online 
study to the values measured by the WVS we focus on two sets of explanatory variables. 
The first set includes the simple measures for trust and civic norms widely used in the 
literature on social capital. The second set is construct from a large number of survey 
items to measure values on two well-known dimensions: secular values and emancipa-
tive values. These play a particularly prominent role in theories of cultural and behavior-
al change and have been shown to be indicative of a host of life quality indicators, from 
subjective wellbeing to life expectancy to education, information access, income equality, 
physical security, rule of law, democracy, social capital and ecological sustainability 
(Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, 2010; Welzel, 2013). 
How exactly the two sets of values are measured and is explained below. 
The second part of our study consists of an online experiment in which the re-
spondents were invited to participate. The interviewers informed all participants of the 
WVS about our online study at the end of the interview. Each participant received a flyer 
with information about the content of the online study, the possibility of earning money, 
and the login information. Each participant received a unique and randomly generated 
six digit login code. We used this code to match the answers in the questionnaire to the 
behavior in the online games. Moreover, all participants were asked by the interviewer 
to indicate their email address. Participants willing to provide us their address received 
an email with a personalized link to our online study.  
The study consisted of several decision situations: a public goods game, a prop-
erty rights game, and a donation decision.3 Furthermore, all parts of the online experi-
                                               
3  Participants also played a public goods game with punishment, a risk elicitation task, and a 
task measuring honesty. To keep the paper concise we restrict our attention to the public 
goods game, the property rights game and the donation decision. In short, the analysis of 
the remaining games supports the results reported in this paper. The link between the moral 
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ment are designed such that no real-time interaction among the participants was neces-
sary. For all decisions involving more than one participant, we collected the answers 
over the entire data collection period and matched subjects into groups at the very end 
of the study. Participants could answer the questions at their convenience and it was 
possible to quit the study and continue at a later point in time. 
Following the methodological standards for behavioral games we incentivized the 
decisions of participants. In all decision situations subjects could earn Talers. The 
amount of Talers depended on their decision, luck, and – in case of group decisions – on 
the decision of another randomly selected participant. For each decision situation we 
randomly drew a group or a person, who received the amount they earned in the given 
situation. The Talers were paid out to the winners with an exchange rate of 1 Taler to 4 
Euros. The fact that they could earn money and the exchange rate was communicated 
to all participants at the beginning of the experiment. At the very end of the online ex-
periment participants were asked to indicate (on a voluntary basis) an email address 
such that we could contact them in case they were drawn for receiving their profits in 
money. Among all participants who completed the online experiment and provided us 
with their email address we drew 13 for payment. These participants earned on average 
€305 (min: €0, max: €700). Payments were made via bank transfers. 
 
 
Trust and Civic Norms 
 
The literature defines social capital as encompassing trust, adherence to cooperative 
norms and membership in voluntary associations (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993). 
Knack and Keefer (1997) were among the first to include measures for social capital in a 
cross-country analysis. They found that higher levels of trust and civic cooperation cor-
relate positively with economic growth and investment rates across countries. To meas-
ure a country’s average trust level, the authors calculated the percentage of respondents 
answering “most people can be trusted” to the WVS question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?” The average strength of civic norms in a country is measured by a 
given population’s overall rejection of three anti-social behaviors addressed in the WVS, 
namely “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”, “accepting a bribe 
while performing one’s duties” and “cheating on taxes if you have a chance”. Using the 
same measures, other researchers continued to evaluate the link between social capital 
and economic outcomes. For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) show that 
social capital is positively related to the degree of financial development. Similarly, Aghi-
on, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) find that low levels of social capital are linked to 
more government regulations. 
The frequent use of these measures of trust gave rise to a literature investigating 
the explanatory power of trust in controlled experiments. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, 
and Soutter (2000) investigate the relation between the trust question and behavior in a 
trust game and do not find a strong relation. Gächter, Hermann, and Thöni (2004) find 
                                                                                                                                            
values and the public goods game with punishment is essentially the same as in public 
goods game (see section “Contributions to the public good”). Honesty seems to be weakly 
positively correlated with emancipative values. We do not find evidence that moral values 
have predictive power for the risk preferences. 
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only weak evidence for the relation between trust questions and cooperation, while, 
Thöni, Tyran, and Wegström (2012) find a positive link between trust and cooperative 
behavior in a large and representative sample of the Danish population. We extend this 
literature by focusing on a broader array of experimental games and by including civic 
norms and moral values as additional explanatory variables. 
 
 
Moral Values 
 
Moral values are considered as internalized preferences about desirable social outcomes 
and they are supposed to direct people’s actions towards these outcomes (Kluckhohn, 
1951). Thus, moral values are assumed to be behaviorally consequential. In a dozen or 
so publications, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel have identified two sets of values as partic-
ularly relevant: secular values and emancipative values (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris 
& Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The emergence of these two sets of val-
ues is described as a psychological reaction to the societal transformations that modern-
ization brings about. Welzel (2013: 37-56) describes modernization as an empowering 
process through which the lives of ordinary people improve. Indeed, where and when it 
happens, modernization makes people’s lives safer, longer and enriches them with more 
options to pursue a purpose of their choice. Modernization, thus, transforms the nature 
of life, turning it from a source of threats to suffer into a source of opportunities to 
thrive. As this happens, societies climb the “utility ladder of freedoms”: tolerating and 
practicing freedoms becomes increasingly vital to take advantage of the options that a 
more promising life offers. In recognition of this utility shift, people change their moral 
values: they begin to see less value in sacred authority and more value in equal free-
doms. The first process—depreciation of sacred authority – is reflected in rising secular 
values and is linked to a growing sense of existential security. The second process–
appreciation of equal freedoms – is reflected in rising emancipative values and linked to 
a growing sense of individual autonomy. 
Emancipative values, for their part, combine an emphasis on freedom of choice 
with an emphasis on equality of opportunities. The egalitarian component of these val-
ues has a strongly anti-discriminatory impetus that favors a deeper internalization of im-
partiality norms. Welzel (2013: 191-214) hypothesizes that this equity-tendency of 
emancipative values predisposes their carriers to pro-social, cooperative behavior vis-à-
vis strangers. As we will demonstrate, this hypothesis—which has never been tested be-
fore—is accurate: people with stronger emancipative values indeed contribute more to 
common pools and donate more for charity purposes. The latter tendency is particularly 
pronounced, which brings the altruistic tendency of emancipative more clearly to the 
surface: donating is freely giving away gains without any return, whereas there still is a 
return to common pool contributions. 
Secular values, on the other hand, grow on rising feelings of existential security. 
This suggests that supporters of these values are averse to protectionist behavior. Con-
firming this expectation, our data demonstrate that players with stronger secular values 
invest their endowed resources in more productive and less so in protective purposes. 
Emancipative values and secular values are each measured on the basis of 
twelve items from the WVS. The twelves items of secular values measure distance from 
sacred authority in the domains of religion, the nation, the state and group pressures. 
The twelve items of emancipative values measure an emphasis on equal freedoms in the 
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domains of personal autonomy, gender equality, the voice of the people and lifestyle 
choice. These items are combined in a “formative index” procedure, as documented in 
meticulous detail by Welzel (2013: 57-73). These pages also document the cross-cultural 
validity and dimensional reliability of these measures as well as their approximately 
normal distribution. Index scores vary from minimum 0 to maximum 1 on both value 
indices. 
 
Public Goods Games 
 
The public goods game is one of the standard tools in experimental economics to elicit 
cooperative behavior (Ledyard, 1995). In our case, we group players in pairs of two on a 
random basis. Each participant is endowed with 100 Talers and has to decide how many 
Talers to contribute to a common pool, called the group account. All Talers in the group 
account are multiplied by 1.5 and the resulting sum returned to the two participants in 
equal shares. Thus, independent of a participant’s contribution to the group account 
he/she is entitled to half of the amount in the group account. Hence, the payoff function 
of a participant i in a group with participant j is:  
 
 
 
Under standard game-theoretic assumptions (selfish preferences and rationality) 
this game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which both players contribute zero to the 
public good. From the perspective of the individual, contributing yields a negative payoff 
because for each Taler she contributes to the group account she only receives 0.75 Ta-
lers in return; the fact that she also receives 0.75 Talers for every Taler contributed by 
the other player does not change the incentive because she receives that return no mat-
ter what. In contrast, the added return that both players together receive – the group 
return – is 1.5 of both contributions. Hence, the social optimum results when both play-
ers contribute their full endowment. This game models the conflict between individual 
and collective rationality and is a model for social dilemmas, ranging from working in a 
team to produce a joint output up to reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
In the design of the online study we paid much attention to guide participants 
carefully through the experiment and to give instructions that are intuitive and easy to 
understand. All instructions are supported by interactive graphs. Participants go through 
four stages before taking their decision. First, they read the instructions of the public 
goods game, explained by six bullet points. The bullet points appear consecutively on 
the screen, and each step is accompanied by a new element in the graphical representa-
tion of the game. Participants can go back and forth between the bullet points. Second, 
participants are shown the payoff consequences of three possible outcomes of the game 
(zero and full contribution by both participants, and contributions of 60 resp. 100 Talers). 
Third, participants enter an exploration stage, where they can enter any combination of 
the two contributions and calculate their own and the other group members’ hypothet-
ical payoff. Figure 1 shows the screen of this exploration stage. Fourth, participants have 
to answer control questions. In the control questions they are presented with a random-
ly selected combination of contributions and have to calculate the resulting payoff. Par-
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ticipants who provide an incorrect answer are asked to try again for two times.4  Finally, 
participants take their decision and continue with the other parts of the experiment. 
 
 
 
Property Rights Game 
 
The property rights game aims to capture the strategic situation in an environ-
ment with weak external enforcement of property rights. The design is similar to Cam-
pos-Ortiz et al. (2012). Our game has an agricultural framing in which participants act as 
“farmers” who can allocate resources (“working hours”) to (i) grow food (produce car-
rots), (ii) protect their fields, and (iii) take (steal) from the fields of the other farmer. 
Depending on their own decisions and those of their paired counterpart, players end up 
with more or less carrots. The final number of carrots is transferred into Talers such that 
each carrot is equivalent to one Taler. Growing food is the only productive activity, the 
other two activities affect only the distribution of wealth. In our setting, participants re-
ceive an initial monetary endowment5, seven fields to grow carrots, and seven units of 
resources, framed as working hours. They are paired into groups of two. Subjects sim-
                                               
4  Answering correctly is not a requirement to play the game, as we did not want to lose re-
spondents not willing or unable to answer the control question. 
5  We implemented three endowment treatments, where the initial endowment in the group 
was not the same. In one treatment, the player was rich compared to the other person in 
the group. In the other treatment the player was poor, and in the baseline treatment both 
players had the same endowment. Allocation to those treatments has been done randomly. 
Thus, the effect of the treatment should not influence the analysis, with regards to emanci-
pative and secular values. Hence, we will not discuss these treatments in this paper. 
Figure 1. Screen Shot of the Public Goods Game.  
Player A (left) contributed 60 Talers to the common project and player B contributed his 
full endowment of 100 Talers to the group project. Hence, both players get 120 out of 
the group project. At the end, player A earns 160 Talers and player B 120 Talers. 
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Figure 2. Screen Shot of the Property Rights Game.  
The figure depicts a situation where player A (left) allocates three units to plant, two to 
protect, and two to take (steal). Player B allocates six units to protect and one to steal. 
This leads to payoffs of 40 Talers for player A and 43 Talers for player B. 
ultaneously allocate their resources to production, protection, and steal. Similar to the 
public goods game participants go through four stages of learning end exploring the 
game and all parts are accompanied by interactive graphics. 
The three activities – production, protect, and steal – have the following payoff 
implications: each resource for production yields a carrot on each of the seven fields. 
The marginal return is thus seven Talers if the other participant does not steal some of 
the participant’s fields. Each resource unit allocated to protect builds a fence around one 
field, i.e. protects this specific field against theft. Each unit allocated to stealing results 
in the annexation of the crop of one field of the other participant (the hands in Figure 2), 
up to the number of unprotected fields. Stealing starts from above, protecting starts 
from below. The marginal return of stealing depends on the allocation of resources of 
the other participant. If the other participant allocates all her resources to production 
then stealing a field yields seven Talers. In case the other participant does not plant at 
all, his fields are empty and stealing provides no benefit. 
 
 
In this game a player’s best response under standard assumptions is to allocate 
all her resources to plant and steal if the other player does not protect and allocates less 
than six units to steal. If the other player allocates six or more units to steal then the 
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best response is to protect three or four fields and use the remaining resources to plant. 
In case the other player protects (and allocates less than six units to steal) there is a 
unique best-response to allocate all the resources to plant. In brief, a player protects if 
she expects excessive stealing.  She allocates all resources to plant if she expects some 
(minimal) degree of protection, and she is indifferent between stealing and planting if 
the other player does not protect at all. Nash equilibria in this game are all situations in 
which both players allocate all their resources to plant and steal and do not steal more 
than five units. Payoffs in the Nash equilibria range from 14 in the situation where both 
players steal five units to 49 with no stealing. The Nash equilibrium without stealing 
maximizes total surplus and thus is the social optimum. Protection cannot be part of an 
equilibrium, because the best reply to protect is not to steal, which in turn makes pro-
tecting not a best response. 
 
Donation Decision 
 
The third task provides us with a measure for altruism. At the end of the survey partici-
pants are asked to indicate how much of their potential earnings they would be willing 
to donate to a charity of their choice. Participants’ earnings depend on random events, 
therefore they do not yet know their earnings when making this decision. We ask them 
to indicate the percentage of their potential earnings they are willing to donate. In addi-
tion, participants choose a charity from a set of four charities (WWF, Amnesty Interna-
tional, Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders) or indicate any other charitable organization 
to donate the money. In case a participant is chosen for final payment we allocated the 
resulting income according to the chosen percentage to the participant and the respec-
tive charity. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
In total 252 respondents of the WVS participated in at least one of the games in the 
online experiment, of whom 55.6% are women. This compares to 50.4% women in the 
remainder of the WVS sample, indicating a slight over-representation of female re-
spondents. Participants tend to be younger than the population: the mean age in the 
online sample is 42.5 (SD = 15.2), compared to 49.5 (SD = 17.7) in the rest of the WVS 
sample. We will address the potential sampling bias in more detail in section “Controlling 
for Sample Selection Bias”. Over the course of the online experiment we observe some 
dropout, such that the number of observations varies from one task to the other, leaving 
us with 179 participants who completed the entire online experiment. Women finish the 
survey more often than men (p = .056, χ2-test). Apart from that we find no systematic 
differences between dropouts and finishers. We start the presentation of our results with 
an analysis of the public goods game. Then we discuss the property rights game, and 
finally we address the donation decision. 
 
Contributions to the Public Good 
 
We observe the contributions of 252 participants in the public goods game. The mean 
contribution is 55.1 out of 100 Talers, with a standard deviation of 25.4. Figure 3 shows 
the histogram of the contributions. Only four participants contributed zero Talers (1.6%). 
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Compared to other public goods games, the proportion of free-riders in our experiment 
is very low. In an online experiment in Denmark, with a randomly selected sample from 
the population, Thöni et al. (2012) observe that 15 percent of the subjects contribute 
zero. On the other hand, the average contribution is lower than in the Danish sample, 
where participants on average contribute 70 percent of their endowment. 
To examine the link between cooperation, social capital and moral values, we 
conduct multiple regression analyses. We use OLS estimates with robust standard errors 
to regress the contribution decision in the online experiment on individual survey 
measures from the WVS interview. We start with the evaluation between trust, civic 
norms and the contribution in the public goods game. Model (1) in Table 1 depicts the 
relation between these variables. In line with the results by Thöni et al. (2012) we find 
that trust predicts contributions in the public goods game. Participants, who think that 
one can in general trust others, contribute significantly more. The estimated effect sug-
gests that people who trust contribute roughly seven Talers more. On the other hand, 
people indicating stronger civic norms do not seem to contribute more or less than peo-
ple indicating weak civic norms. This finding coincides with Welzel’s (2007: 405-406) 
criticism of this measurement as an indicator of civic norms. 
Model (2) shows the link between emancipative and secular values and the con-
tribution to the public goods game. The results confirm the predictions by Welzel (2013): 
people with stronger emancipative values contribute significantly more to the public 
good. To interpret the observed effect, we standardized the independent variables. In-
creasing emancipative values by one standard deviation increases the contribution to the 
public good by 3.5 Talers. The secular values do not seem to account for any variance in 
the contribution decision. In model (3) and (4) we add control variables to test the ro-
bustness of the results observed in model (1) and (2), respectively. Aside from the obvi-
ous controls for gender and age we added two control variables capturing general politi-
cal interest and the political orientation. We will use the same set of control variables in 
all regressions that follow below.6 
                                               
6    Due to the significant correlations between the variables for social capital and moral values, 
we do not estimate a model which contains all four independent variables at once. The cor-
relation between the emancipative values and trust is 0.077 (p < 0.001). On the other hand, 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of Contributions to the Public Good 
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The coefficients of trust and emancipative values stay roughly the same. The 
control measures we incorporated for general political interest and left-right orientation 
do not reveal further information in neither of the two models.7 
                                                                                                                                            
secular values are strongly negatively correlated to the measure for civic norms (r = -0.527, 
p < 0.001). 
7   Alternatively we estimated models including the Big Five personality measures, a measure 
for association membership, and outgroup trust. The personality characteristics are meas-
ured in the World Values Survey according to Muck, Hell, and Gosling (2007). Previous re-
search (Lu & Argyle, 1991; Asthon, Jackson, Helmes, & Paunonen, 1998) has shown that ex-
traversion and agreeableness are positively correlated to cooperation, whereas neuroticism 
is negatively linked to cooperative behavior. Moreover, Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok (2011) find 
that participants who scored higher on agreeableness are more likely to have stable cooper-
ation preferences. In our data we do not find any strong relationship between cooperation 
and personality traits. Association membership measures voluntary group membership in 
various organizations (sport, recreation, art, music, educational, environmental, humanitari-
an, charitable organization). Again we find no significant effect on behavior in the public 
goods game. Finally we included a measure for outgroup trust in the estimates. Outgroup 
trust is based on the question about trust in people you meet for the first time, people of 
another religion, and people of another nationality. Outgroup trust seems to be positively 
linked to the amount contributed in the public goods game. This result is consistent with the 
observation in our main analysis. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution 
Trust 7.039**  6.764**  
 (3.205)  (3.416)  
Civic norms -0.525  -1.526  
 (1.855)  (1.948)  
Emancipative values  3.498*  3.556* 
  (1.896)  (2.080) 
Secular values  2.701  2.428 
  (1.864)  (1.946) 
Political interest   -0.394 0.187 
   (1.911) (1.957) 
Left-right   -1.372 -0.112 
   (2.702) (2.811) 
Female   -2.183 -3.048 
   (3.544) (3.608) 
Age   0,075 0.088 
   (0.111) (0.108) 
Constant 51.274*** 52.061*** 49.276*** 49.602*** 
 (2.138) (1.736) (6.144) (5.899) 
F-test 2.4 3.7 1.3 1.4 
Prob > F 0.092 0.025 0.262 0.226 
R^2  0.012 0.021 0.003 0.010 
N 245 246 233 234 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is contribution [0,100]. Independent variables are standardized except 
for age, female and trust. Female and trust are dummy variables. Political interest measures how interested a per-
son is in politics. Left-right indicates where a person positions herself with regards to left and right on a scale from 
0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher numbers right. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 1. OLS Estimations for the Contribution to the Public Good 
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Overall we observe a positive relation between trust, emancipative values and contribu-
tions to the public good, which is robust to the inclusion of different control variables. 
Both with and without the additional controls the models that include moral values ex-
plain more variance than the models with the simple trust and civic norms measures. 
 
Production and Protection in the Property Rights Game 
 
In total, 188 participants completed the property rights game.8 On average participants 
spend 4.37 units (62%) on production with a standard deviation of 1.66.9  Histograms of 
the allocation of the resources to production, protection, and stealing are shown in Figure 
4. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following analysis we focus on production and protection. Since partici-
pants have to distribute all seven units, the resources invested into stealing can be de-
rived from the other two actions. Table 2 shows regressions with robust standard errors 
to analyze the relationship between production, and our covariates from the survey. 
Similar to the public goods game, we find that the production decision is positively relat-
ed to trust, but not to the attitude towards civic norms (model (1)). A person who trusts 
allocates roughly 0.6 units more to the productive activity. In model (2) we observe a 
strong relationship between production and secular values, but not between emancipa-
tive values and the behavioral measure. We observe that subjects who score one stand-
ard deviation higher on the secular values, allocate on average 0.33 units more to pro-
duction. For both models, the effect and its size are robust to the inclusion of political 
and demographic control variables (model (3) and (4)). The political variables do not 
seem to be related to productive activity.10  Overall, we find that both, trust and the 
secular values have robust predictive power for the production decision in our property 
rights game. 
                                               
8    The game consisted of two consecutive allocation decisions. In this paper, we keep the fo-
cus on the first decision. 
9    Our results are comparable to the results by Campos-Ortiz et al. (2012), where participants 
spent roughly 43% of their endowment for production. 
10  The personality traits, openness to experience seems to be positively related to production: 
respondents who rate themselves to be open to experience allocate more resources to pro-
duction. Moreover, including association membership and outgroup trust does not reveal fur-
ther information. 
Figure 4. Allocation of the resources in the property rights game. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Production Production Production Production 
Trust 0.591**  0.561**  
 (0.244)  (0.260)  
Civic norms -0.140  -0.197  
 (0.132)  (0.141)  
Emancipative values  0.163  0.139 
  (0.158)  (0.178) 
Secular values  0.329**  0.350** 
  (0.133)  (0.140) 
Political interest   0.016 0.084 
   (0.152) (0.155) 
Left-right   -0.078 0.013 
   (0.210) (0.218) 
Female   -0.104 -0.110 
   (0.278) (0.285) 
Age   0.010 0.011 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 4.069*** 4.187*** 3.724*** 3.809*** 
 (0.157) (0.142) (0.444) (0.438) 
F-test 3.5 4.5 1.6 2.3 
Prob > F 0.033 0.012 0.147 0.040 
R^2 adjusted 0.026 0.037 0.015 0.027 
N 182 183 172 173 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is production [0,7]. Independent variables are standard-
ized except for age, female and trust. Female and trust are dummy variables. Political interest 
measures how interested a person is in politics. Left-right indicates where a person positions her-
self with regards to left and right on a scale from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher 
numbers right. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
In the next step we analyze the protection decision. As mentioned above, devot-
ing resources to protection is not part of an equilibrium. However, if excessive stealing is 
expected, allocating three or four units to protection is a best response. We observe that 
80% of participants allocated at least one working units to protection. On average 1.94 
units (standard deviation: 1.33) are devoted to protection.11 
The multiple regression analyses in Table 3 show a different pattern to that of 
production behavior for the evaluation of the link between social capital and the protec-
tion decision. In model (1) we find trust to be weakly linked to protection. When includ-
ing the control variables, we observe the attitude towards civic norms to be colligated to 
the protection decision. Interestingly people with a higher score on the civic norms tend 
to protect more (model (3)). In model (2) we look at the link between moral values and 
the protection decision. Participants, who score high on secular values, use significantly 
less resources for protection. We find that an increase of secular values by one standard 
deviation leads to a decrease of protection of roughly 0.35 units. Including the control 
variables for age, gender, political interest, and ideological orientation does not change 
the observed effects.12 
                                               
11   In Campos-Ortiz et al. (2012) participants spent on average about 30% of the resources for 
protection. 
12   As mentioned in section “Contributions to the Public Good”, some of the personality traits 
are weakly correlated to secular values, thus by adding these variables to the regression 
Table 2. OLS Estimates for Production 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Protection Protection Protection Protection 
Trust -0.325*  -0.348  
 (0.196)  (0.214)  
Civic norms 0.174  0.206*  
 (0.107)  (0.113)  
Emancipative values  -0.013  0.001 
  (0.132)  (0.144) 
Secular values  -0.348***  -0.359*** 
  (0.118)  (0.125) 
Political interest   0.114 0.043 
   (0.113) (0.113) 
Left-right   0.095 0.036 
   (0.162) (0.165) 
Female   0.023 -0.001 
   (0.227) (0.230) 
Age   -0.009 -0.008 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 2.105*** 2.034*** 2.416*** 2.353*** 
 (0.126) (0.113) (0.374) (0.366) 
F-test 2.8 5.3 1.5 2.1 
Prob > F 0.066 0.006 0.183 0.052 
R^2 adjusted 0.018 0.049 0.009 0.035 
N 182 183 172 173 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is protection [0,7]. Independent variables are standard-
ized except for age, female and trust. Female and trust are dummy variables. Political interest 
measures how interested a person is in politics. Left-right indicates where a person positions her-
self with regards to left and right on a scale from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher 
numbers right. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
To conclude, we observe that behavior in the property rights game is tightly as-
sociated to secular values. Participants, who score high on those values, allocate on av-
erage more resources to production and use fewer resources to protect. Consequently, 
the higher the score on secular values, the closer a participants’ behavior to the socially 
optimal behavior. Interestingly, while we observe that secular values are linked positive-
ly to production and negatively to protection, they are not significantly linked to stealing.   
 
Donations 
 
We observe behavior in the donation decision for 179 subjects. On average participants 
are willing to donate 14.4 percent of their potential income to a charity. A bit more than 
half of the participants (54 percent), are willing to donate. Among the participants who 
donated, the mean donation is 26.6 percent. Figure 5 shows a histogram for the per-
centages chosen, conditional on having donated a positive amount.13   
                                                                                                                                            
(model (4)), the coefficient for secular values becomes a little less significant and decreases 
slightly. As in the previous section, we do not observe a link between association member-
ship, outgroup trust and behavior in the property rights game. 
13   Mean donations are rather low, compared to the results observed in Benz and Meier (2008), 
where participants donate on average 65% of their earnings. However, in this experiment 
Table 3. OLS Estimates for Protection 
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To investigate the link between behavior and values, we applied again multiple 
OLS regressions. Table 4 depicts the results. In model (1) we regress the amount do-
nated (as percentage) on trust and civic norms. Both variables account for some vari-
ance of the dependent variable. The coefficient for trust indicates that subjects who 
trust donate on average 7.1 percentage points more. An increase of one standard devia-
tion in civic norms leads to an increase in the amount donated of about five percentage 
points. In model (3) we include our standard controls and observe that trust is no longer 
significant. The coefficient for civic norms is still highly significant but the effect size de-
creases. In model (2) we regress the amount donated on emancipative and secular val-
ues. We find that emancipative values have strong explanatory power for the donation 
decision. Participants with a higher score on the emancipative values are willing to do-
nate significantly more. The effect is robust to the inclusion of our control variables 
(model (4)). In addition, we observe a strong relationship between age and donation: 
the older a person, the higher the donation, on average. Furthermore, in both extended 
models (3) and (4) we find a positive and significant link between the donation decision 
and political interest. In other words, the more interested a person is in politics, the 
more the person is willing to donate to charity.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
participants could donate from an extra endowment, instead from their experimental earn-
ings. In a design very similar to ours (with a student sample) Schulz et al. (2015) find about 
44 percent willing to donate and 16.3 percent of the earnings donated on average. 
14   Additionally we included the personality traits into the regression (results not reported in the 
table). However, we do not observe any significant link between the donation decision and 
the Big Five personality traits. The same holds true when we include association member-
ship and outgroup trust. These variables do not seem to be significantly linked to the 
amount donated. 
Figure 5. Histogram of the Amount Donated 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Donation Donation Donation Donation 
Trust 7.142**  3.600  
 (3.114)  (3.427)  
Civic norms 5.226***  3.275***  
 (1.063)  (0.985)  
Emancipative values  5.720***  4.380** 
  (1.879)  (1.701) 
Secular values  -2.155  -1.875 
  (1.773)  (1.575) 
Political interest   3.077** 2.751** 
   (1.512) (1.329) 
Left-right   -2.484 -1.711 
   (2.214) (2.246) 
Female   -3.296 -4.426 
   (3.384) (3.455) 
Age   6.320*** 7.061*** 
   (2.178) (2.006) 
Constant 11.415*** 12.180*** 16.719*** 17.368*** 
 (2.244) (1.376) (3.963) (2.834) 
F-test 15.0 4.7 6.0 3.7 
Prob > F 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.002 
R^2 adjusted 0.067 0.038 0.153 0.157 
N 172 173 162 163 
Notes: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is donation [0,100]. Independent variables 
are standardized except for female. Political interest measures how interested a person 
is in politics. Left-right indicates where a person positions herself with regards to left 
and right on a scale from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher numbers right. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Overall, the effect size of emancipative values on donation is in the magnitude of 
an increase between 4.4 and 5.7 percentage points per standard deviation. If we esti-
mate the link between the donation decision and the values only with the sample of 
people who donate, the results stay the same, but effect size increases to roughly 7 per-
centage points. Figure 6 shows a bar chart of the average donations for multiple catego-
ries of our measure for emancipative values. 
 
 
 
Table 4. OLS Estimates for Donation 
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Summing up, for the donation decision we observe a positive relationship be-
tween the amount donated and the emancipative values and adherence to civic norms. 
Our results provide further evidence to the discussion whether moral values are classi-
fied as civic or non-civic (Welzel, 2010). Compared to previous research, our measure of 
altruism has the advantage that it reflects actual donation decisions. Hence, our analysis 
supports the hypothesis that self-expression values are linked to civic behavior. 
 
CONTROLLING FOR SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
 
At the beginning of the section “Results” we mentioned that women and young people 
are overrepresented in our experimental sample when compared to the population of 
WVS respondents. To control for a potential sample selection bias we apply the Heck-
man method (Heckman, 1979).15 The first step of the Heckman correction is to calculate 
the individual probability to belong to the selected sample, by estimating a probit model. 
Second, the inverse Mill’s ratio is predicted by using the estimated coefficient of the se-
lection equation. Subsequently the original regression is estimated, using the inverse 
Mill’s ratio as a regressor. 
Crucial to the application of this method is the identification of the selection 
equation. In practice this means that the selection equation has to include at least one 
variable which matters for selection, but is not related to the outcome variable (exclu-
sion restriction). Ideally, this variable does not come from the respondent’s answers or 
characteristics. Fortunately we have a variable which strongly predicts participation but 
is, most likely, unrelated to the outcome variable. The variable is a measure for an inter-
viewer’s success in motivating the respondents of the World Values Survey in participat-
ing in the online study. The WVS interviews were conducted by 134 different interview-
ers. For each interviewer we calculate an individual success rate as the total number of 
                                               
15   We calculated all models with the Heckman two-step method. The results point all into the 
same direction. In the following we only show the results for the simpler models. 
Figure 6. Emancipative values and donations. The figure depicts means of the 
amount donated in each category. Emancipative Values are categorized in the 
following way: 3:0.2-0.3, 4:0.3-0.3, 5:0.4-0.5, 6:0.5-0.6, 7:0.6-0.7, 8:0.7-0.8, 
9:0.8-0.9. The scale starts at 3 as we do not observe participants who donated, 
with a value lower than 0.2 
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email addresses collected, divided by the total number of interviews conducted. Inter-
viewers differed a lot in their success rate (mean: 0.24; SD: 0.22; min: 0; max: 1). This 
variable is highly related to selection into the online sample but unlikely to be related to 
the dependent variables of interest. Participants who indicated their email address are 
more likely to participate in our online study, because we were able to send them a di-
rect link to the study. On the other hand, the success rate of the interviewer is not likely 
to be related to, for example, individual contribution in the public goods game.16  
Table 5 compares the results for the OLS and the Heckman models for contribu-
tion, production, and protection. In all three cases OLS and Heckman produce similar 
results, indicating that our results are not driven by selection bias.  We also estimated 
the Heckman models for the donation decision. Similar to the results reported above, we 
find no indication that our results are driven by selection. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our study is the first of its kind to examine the individual-level linkage between moral 
values and cooperative behavior. We observe a distinct pattern; first, trust seems to be 
important for decisions, which rely on the behavior of another person. In contrast, when 
the decision does not depend on the behavior of another person, trust is not predictive. 
For the moral values we have shown convincing evidence for three tendencies: (a) 
emancipative values motivate higher shared contributions, (b) stronger secular values 
inspire more productive and less protective investments and (c) emancipative values 
lead to higher donations. These tendencies proved robust when controlling for bias, de-
mographic characteristics, public interest, ideological orientations as well as personality 
traits. 
                                               
16   We do not observe any statistically significant correlation between our dependent variables 
and the individual success rate of the interviewer. Hence, the use of individual success rate 
as exclusion restriction seems appropriate. 
 Contribution Production Protection 
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Emancipative Values 24.079* 30.382** 0.864 1.047 -0.081 -0.231 
 (12.612) (13.680) (1.073) (1.014) (0.886) (0.811) 
Secular Values 15.365 15.365 2.218** 2.350** -2.200*** -2.339*** 
 (12.567) (12.586) (0.908) (0.916) (0.812) (0.741) 
Female -3.424 -3.704 -0.202 0.001 0.047 0.000 
 (3.418) (3.548) (0.265) (0.011) (0.214) (0.008) 
Age .006 -.115 0.007 -0.125 -0.005 -0.020 
 (.106) (.118) (0.008) (0.268) (0.006) (0.213) 
Income .568 .243 0.060 0.044 0.001 0.015 
 (.765) (.780) (0.060) (0.058) (0.045) (0.046) 
Constant 31.889*** 29.761*** 2.403*** 2.089** 3.120*** 3.397*** 
 (9.840) (10.654) (0.729) (0.835) (0.604) (0.657) 
F-test 1.91 9.94 2.84 10.93 2.42 11.53 
Prob > F 0.092 0.077 0.017 0.053 0.037 0.042 
R2 adjusted 0.035  0.063  0.059  
N 248 248 185 185 185 185 
Table 5. Comparison of OLS and Heckman estimates 
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Among these tendencies, tendency (c) proved particularly strong and stronger 
than tendency (a). In other words, the hypothesized altruistic impetus of emancipative 
values is more obvious when it comes to charity donations than when it comes to shared 
contributions. This is explicable insofar as charity donations are a more altruistic act than 
shared contributions: what you donate is definitely lost; what you give to sharing is still 
shared, even if this happens at a lower return. 
Also, charity donations represent better universal altruism because the recipients 
are completely anonymous. Shared contributions, by contrast, represent cooperation 
with a very specific other. Hence, Welzel’s argument that emancipative values corre-
spond especially with universal altruism is confirmed, for the German context at least. 
One should note that the altruistic effect of emancipative values is already partly 
obscured by the fact that more people with emancipative values participated in the co-
operation game. This leads to a curtailed variance in emancipative values: Figure 6 has 
shown that people at the lower end of emancipative values did not participate, even 
though they are present in the larger sample. Clearly, it is more difficult to find an effect 
of emancipative values when these values do not cover the full possible range of varia-
tion. We found it nevertheless, which speaks to the robustness of this effect. 
Furthermore, secular values show a more limited impact than emancipative val-
ues—an impact that only shows up with respect to property rights: merely protective 
investments with respect to property becomes less likely under stronger secular values. 
This finding might reflect the fact that secular values thrive under existential security: 
feelings of existential security should make people less protection-oriented. 
Moreover, our analysis confirms that social capital is linked to individual behavior. 
Specifically, trust is related to cooperative behavior in the public goods game and the 
production decision in the property rights game. By contrast, adherence to civic norms is 
only associated with the donation decision, both of which in turn might be driven by so-
cial desirability norms. This would explain the link between the two. 
To conclude, we are convinced that behavioral experiments can contribute sub-
stantially to the body of evidence in the field of cross-cultural research. Experiments 
should be seen as a complementary tool to survey studies and other data sources. A key 
strength of the method is that the experiments depart from a well-defined game, which 
relies on formal rules and mathematical functions. We argue that this allows to mitigate 
the issues with equivalence. We see our study is a promising first step to extend this 
research design to more countries covered in round seven of the WVS. This would allow 
to examine if and how the individual-level linkages between moral values and coopera-
tive behavior vary by cultural background and country-level characteristics. 
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